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Abstract 
 
The increasing evidence that many addictive phenomena have a genetic and neurobiological basis promises 
improvements in societal responses to addiction that raise important ethical and social policy issues. One of 
the major potential benefits of such research is improved treatment of drug addiction, but in order to do the 
research required to realize this promise, it will be necessary to address ethical doubts raised about the 
capacity of addicted persons to give free and informed consent to participate in studies that involve the 
administration of drugs of dependence. Neuroscience research on addiction promises to transform the long 
running debate between moral and medical models of addiction by providing a detailed causal explanation 
of addiction in terms of brain processes. We must avoid causal models of addiction being misinterpreted as 
supporting simple-minded social policies, e.g., that we identify the minority of the community that is 
genetically and biologically vulnerable to addiction and hence can neglect social policy options for 
reducing addiction, including drug control policies. Causal accounts of addiction supplied by neuroscience 
and genetic research may also be seen to warrant the use of pharmacotherapies and drug vaccines under 
legal coercion. Neuroscientists also need to anticipate the ethical issues that may arise if the knowledge that 
they produce delivers interventions that enhance human cognitive and other capacities. Advances in 
neuroimaging that enable us to identify ‘‘addicts’’ or predict future risk of addiction will raise concerns 
about invasion of privacy, third-party use of neuroimaging data, the powers of courts to coerce defendants 
to undergo such tests, and consumer protection against the overinterpretation of test results. Given the 
strong public and media interest in the results of their research, neuroscientists and geneticists have a moral 
obligation, and a professional interest, to minimize popular misunderstandings of their work in the media 
that may rebound to its detriment. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Addiction to alcohol, tobacco, and illicit drugs are common problems among adults in many 
developed societies. In the United States (Anthony & Helzer, 1991; Helzer, Burnam, & McEvoy, 
1991; Kessler et al., 1994) and Australia (Andrews, Henderson, & Hall, 2001) in any year around 
25% of adults are dependent on tobacco, 7% are dependent on alcohol, and 2% are dependent on 
illicit drugs. Addiction to tobacco contributes substantially to the global burden of disease via 
increased premature deaths and years of life lived with disability (Ezzati, Lopez, Rodgers, Vander 
Hoorn, & Murray, 2002; Murray & Lopez, 1996). Addiction to alcohol and other drugs causes 
substantial suffering to persons afflicted by addiction and their behavior adversely effects their 
families and others in the community through motor vehicle accidents, violence, assault and 
crime, and impaired work performance and parenting (Collins & Lapsley, 2002; National 
Academy of Science, 1996). 
 
Neuroscience and genetic research promise to improve our understanding of addiction to nicotine, 
alcohol, and other drugs and thereby increase our ability to treat those afflicted by addiction and 
possibly our capacity to prevent addictive disorders (Adler, 1995; Cami & Farre, 2003; 
Independent Working Group on Brain and Mind Disorders, 2003; Leshner, 1997; National 
Academy of Science, 1996). There is good evidence from twin and adoption studies, for example, 
that there is a substantial genetic contribution to vulnerability to addiction to alcohol, nicotine, 
and other drugs (Ball & Collier, 2002; Hall, Madden, & Lynskey, 2002; True et al., 1999). There 
are also promising candidate genes that may explain this vulnerability (Ball & Collier, 2002; 
Tyndale, 2003), although as yet few of these have been consistently replicated and many of the 
associations are modest (Tyndale, 2003). 
 
Neuroscience research on addiction indicates that it is increasingly likely that the basis for the 
genetic vulnerability to addiction reflects variations in metabolism of drugs of dependence and in 
neurotransmitter function in key brain regions where psychoactive drugs act (Cami & Farre, 
2003; Leshner, 1997; National Academy of Science, 1996). The chronic use of psychoactive 
drugs produces long lasting changes in brain systems that may underlie the rewarding effects of 
drugs, the development of tolerance and the experience of withdrawal symptoms, and the high 
rate of relapse to drug use after abstinence (Adler, 1995). Neuroscience research is beginning to 
provide detailed understanding of brain processes involved in many addictive phenomena and 
accordingly promises to provide more effective pharmacological therapies for addiction that 
target these processes (Adler, 1995; Maldonado, 2003). 
 
The promise of neuroscience and genetic research for understanding addiction also raises major 
ethical and social issues (Independent Working Group on Brain and Mind Disorders, 2003; 
Safire, 2002). These can be considered under two broad headings: (1) ethical issues that arise in 
carrying out neuroscience and genetic research on addiction; and (2) the broader social and 
ethical implications of the potential uses of neuroscience and genetic knowledge (e.g., for 
therapeutic, preventive, and enhancement purposes) and their impacts on public understanding of 
and policies towards addiction (Roskies, 2002). In this paper, we outline the major ethical and 
social issues that will require more systematic and detailed analysis by neuroscience researchers, 
ethicists, policy makers, and the broader community. 
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2. Ethical issues in human neuroscience research on the addictions 
 
Human neuroscience experiments often involve laboratory studies of the effects of chronic drug 
exposure on current brain function or the acute effects of exposure to drugs, drug analogues, or 
drug-related cues (e.g., injecting equipment) on behavior and brain function (Adler, 1995). Such 
studies increasingly use brain imaging technologies (such as PET, SPECT, and fMRI) (Fu & 
McGuire, 1999; Gilman, 1998) to study the acute effects of drugs and the neurobiological 
consequences of chronic drug use (e.g., Kling et al., 2000; Martin- Soelch et al., 2001; Sell et al., 
1999). 
 
Since the Nuremberg trials of German medical researchers after World War II, an international 
consensus has developed that biomedical research on humans (Brody, 1998; Jonsen, 1998) 
requires independent ethical review of the risks and benefits of proposed research, free and 
informed consent from research participants, and protection of privacy and confidentiality of 
information (Brody, 1998). Research involving persons who are cognitively or physically 
impaired requires special ethical consideration (Brody, 1998) because such ‘‘vulnerable persons’’ 
may not be capable of providing informed consent. That is, they may not be able to (1) 
understand the rationale behind a clinical trial, (2) understand exactly what is required of them 
and why, and (3) give their free and informed consent to participate in the study (National 
Bioethics Advisory Commission, 1999). 
 
Concern about research on vulnerable persons has been most pronounced in experimental and 
clinical studies of persons with schizophrenia (Roberts & Roberts, 1999; Shamoo, 1998). Critics 
of such studies (e.g., Hall, 1999) have advocated stringent standards for obtaining informed 
consent for cognitively impaired persons, including independent review by Institutional Review 
Boards whose members include patients or patient advocates (Hall, 1999). Some researchers have 
criticized these types of protection for being cumbersome, overly paternalistic, and denying the 
mentally ill the right to make decisions on their own behalf (Carpenter, Schooler, & Kane, 1997). 
They argue that these restrictions will prevent important research being done into the causes and 
treatment of these disorders (Roberts & Roberts, 
1999). 
 
2.1. Are drug-dependent people vulnerable persons? 
 
Until recently, the view among addiction researchers has been that drug-dependent people are 
able to give free and informed consent to participate in research studies and clinical trials so long 
as they are not intoxicated or suffering acute withdrawal symptoms at the time that they give 
consent (e.g., Adler, 1995; Gorelick, Pickens, & Benkovsky, 1999). It has been recommended 
that the severity of withdrawal symptoms should be assessed when screening potential research 
participants and before obtaining informed consent to participate in a study (Adler, 1995; 
Gorelick et al., 1999). This view has recently been contested by Charland (2002) and Cohen 
(2002). These authors have taken the defining characteristics of drug dependence in DSM-IV—
especially the loss of control over drug use—to mean that people who are drug dependent lack the 
capacity to give free and informed consent to participate in research studies in which they may be 
given their drug of dependence. 
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Cohen (2002) argues that ‘‘the nature and pathology of untreated substance dependence make the 
condition inherently incompatible with a rational, internally uncoerced and informed consent on 
the part of those volunteering to receive addictive drugs in a nontherapeutic research setting’’ (p 
74). This ‘‘may no longer obtain,’’ he argues, after addicts have undergone treatment. According 
to Cohen, it is only ethical to give drugs of dependence in experimental studies to abstinent 
addicts and possibly those who are in treatment. Even though research suggests that alcohol- and 
drug-dependent people who participate in research are helped rather than harmed (e.g., Dolinsky 
& Babor, 1997; Gorelick et al., 1999), we anticipate that ethics committees will not approve 
studies that administer drugs of dependence to abstinent addicts. If ethics review committees 
accept Cohen’s argument, the outcome could be that no experimental research will be undertaken 
in which drug-dependent people receive their drug of dependence. 
 
Charland (2002) has argued that heroin addicts are unable to give free and informed consent to 
participate in heroin prescription trials. Heroin addicts, he argues on the testimony of one former 
heroin addict, are incapable of saying ‘‘no’’ to the offer of free heroin because of their addiction. 
Untreated heroin addicts offered their drug of dependence are ‘‘vulnerable subjects’’ who cannot 
serve as experimental subjects in such studies, or they can only do so if consent is given on their 
behalf by others. If accepted, these views would prevent addicts from participating in clinical 
research from which they stand to benefit. 
 
2.2. Ethical issues in genetic research on addictive disorders 
 
Ethical and social policy issues raised by genetic research to identify heritable traits require 
special attention for the following reasons: (1) the predictive nature of genetic information has the 
potential to adversely affect people’s lives; (2) genetic information carries implications not just 
for individuals but also families; and (3) genetic information has the potential to be used to 
stigmatize and victimize (Australian Law Reform Commission, National Health and Medical 
Research Council, and Australian Health Ethics Committee, 2003). These issues are especially 
pertinent when researching stigmatized health problems such as addictive disorders. 
 
Genetic linkage studies of psychiatric disorders present a number of ethical challenges. 
Challenges faced during the ascertainment process include protecting privacy and ensuring that 
informed consent is given to the collection of information (Alexander, Lerer, & Baron, 1992). 
One of the main difficulties faced by researchers is engaging potential study participants without 
compromising their privacy or that of other participating family members (Alexander et al., 
1992). The predictive nature of genetic information makes this a very salient concern in the study 
of addiction and other psychiatric disorders where misinformation about the causes of the 
disorders and their appropriate treatment may lead to unjustified attributions of blame and guilt, 
which adversely affect relationships between family members (National Health and Medical 
Research Council, 2000; Parker, 2002). 
 
Genetic studies of depressive disorders need to ensure that subjects voluntarily participate in 
research that does not directly benefit them. Persons suffering from bipolar disorders can be 
competent to make such a decision but when they are suffering from these disorders they 
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may feel vulnerable and pressured, or they may be apathetic about being involved. It has been 
suggested that people who suffer from episodic disorders should only be asked to participate in 
studies when they are stable (Nuffield Council on Bioethics, 1998; Parker, 2002). 
 
Individual genetic information collected in research studies should probably not be fed back to 
research participants (Nuffield Council on Bioethics, 1998), although they should be given 
feedback on the overall study results. This is for several reasons: (1) the significance of the 
probabilistic information is often uncertain and this is difficult to explain in the absence of expert 
genetic counseling; and (2) participants who are informed of the genetic test results may be 
required to disclose them to third parties, such as insurers. Making it a rule that genetic 
information not be disclosed to research participants obviates the need for counseling about 
genetic information of uncertain significance and protects participants from being required to 
disclose genetic test results to third parties (Nuffield Council on Bioethics, 1998). 
 
3. Social and ethical implications of neuroscience research on addiction 
 
3.1. Governing ideas of addiction 
 
There has been a long running debate between moral and medical models of addiction (Gerstein 
& Harwood, 1990; Leshner, 1997). A moral model of addiction sees it as largely a voluntary 
behavior in which people choose to engage, and ‘‘addiction’’ as an excuse for bad behavior that 
allows drug users to take drugs without assuming responsibility for their conduct (Szasz, 1997). A 
medical model of addiction, by contrast, recognizes that while many people use drugs without 
losing control over their use, a minority develops an addiction that requires treatment if the 
sufferer is to become and remain abstinent (e.g., Leshner, 1997). The neurosciences improve 
upon older medical models of addiction by promising to provide a causal explanation of addiction 
in terms of detailed changes in brain processes (Mauron, 2003). One influential thesis is that 
addiction is a ‘‘brain disease’’ that results from the flick of a metaphorical switch in the brain that 
occurs as a result of chronic drug abuse (Leshner, 1997). This perspective undermines the simple 
view that addiction is wholly a matter of individual choice and hence that drug users are best 
dealt with by punishment and imprisonment. 
 
A neurochemical model of addiction has a number of as yet unrealized advantages over moral 
models of addiction. It makes possible a more humane, less punitive response to addiction by 
raising the prospect of increased funding for addiction treatment, reducing the need for 
imprisonment as the first line treatment for addiction, and reducing the stigmatization of those 
who are addicted to drugs. It is for these reasons a view that appeals to some people who are 
addicted to drugs and to some of their families. A ‘‘disease’’ that can be ‘‘seen’’ in the many-
hued splendor of a PET scan carries more conviction than one justified by the possibly 
exculpatory self-reports of individuals who claim to be unable to control their drug use. Medical 
models of addiction may also, however, be interpreted as favoring simple-minded social policies. 
For example, the idea that addiction is a categorical disease entity lends itself to a seductive 
simplification in the case of alcohol, namely, that if we identify the minority of 
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people who are genetically vulnerable to alcohol dependence, then the rest of the population can 
use alcohol with impunity (Hall & Sannibale, 1996). This view ignores the adverse public health 
effects of alcohol intoxication, the dimensional nature of symptoms of dependence, and the 
evidence that multiple genes are involved in susceptibility to alcohol and drug dependence. It can 
possibly lead to addicts to abdicate responsibility for their behavior (Nelkin & Lindee, 1996). 
 
The challenge for addiction neuroscience researchers is to give biology its due without depicting 
addicts as automatons driven by the state of receptors in their midbrains (Valenstein, 1998). 
Addiction needs to be seen, in part, as the result of choices that are not always wisely made by 
young people who operate with a short time perspective, a sense of personal invulnerability and 
skepticism towards elders’ advice about the risks of drug use. Loss of control over drug use is 
also a matter of degree, with most dependent drug users retaining some capacity to reduce their 
drug use or to become abstinent. Pharmacological drug treatments need to be seen as prostheses 
for an impaired will, a kind of Ulyssian self-binding against temptation, rather than the sine qua 
non of addiction treatment. Pharmacological treatment needs to be seen as the beginning of the 
process of recovery and reintegration of the drug-dependent person into the community. We still 
need to attend to a broader range of social policies in seeking to prevent drug use by youth 
(Spooner & Hall, 2002). 
 
3.2. Coerced treatment of addiction 
 
The most likely benefit of neuroscience and genetic research on addiction is improved treatment 
of drug-dependent persons. This might happen in a number of ways. First, a better understanding 
of the genetic and neuroscience bases of drug dependence may lead to more effective drugs to 
assist in cessation of drug use (Leshner, 1997; National Academy of Science, 1996; Walton, 
Johnstone, Munafo, Neville, & Griffiths, 2001). These may include drugs that act on key neural 
reward pathways or affect drug metabolism. Such drugs may have fewer adverse side effects than 
existing ones. Second, genotyping may better match patients to existing pharmacological 
treatments for addiction, such as bupropion and nicotine replacement in the case of smoking 
(Munafo, Johnstone, Murphy, & Walton, 2001; Walton et al., 2001). 
 
There is a less welcome possibility that may arise from the development of more effective 
pharmacological and immunological treatments for addiction. If addicts are seen to be suffering 
from a brain disease that robs them of their autonomy and impairs their capacity to consent to 
treatment, then, some will argue, we should treat them under legal coercion. This could in 
principle be ‘‘for their own good,’’ although in practice coerced treatment has most often been 
advocated for drug-dependent people who commit criminal offences. 
 
3.2.1. The case for coerced treatment 
 
Legally coerced drug treatment for persons charged with or convicted of an offence to which their 
drug dependence has contributed is usually provided as an alternative to incarceration under the 
threat of imprisonment if the person fails to comply with treatment 
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(Hall, 1997; Spooner, Hall, & Mattick, 2001). One of its major justifications is that treating 
offenders’ drug dependence will reduce the likelihood of their reoffending (Gerstein & Harwood, 
1990; Inciardi & McBride, 1991). The advent of HIV/AIDS has provided an additional argument 
for treating rather than imprisoning drug-dependent offenders (Dolan, Wodak, Hall, Gaughwin, & 
Rae, 1996). The correctional and public health arguments for drug treatment under coercion are 
reinforced by the economic argument that it is less costly to treat offenders who are drug 
dependent in the community than it is to imprison them (Gerstein & Harwood, 1990). 
 
3.2.2. Ethical issues in coerced treatment 
 
Some authors reject any form of treatment under coercion for any form of drug dependence. 
Szasz (1997), for example, denies that drug dependence exists, arguing that all drug use is 
voluntary. According to him, the law should not prohibit adults from using any drug, and any 
drug user who commits a criminal offence should be punished, with no excuses by reason of drug 
dependence. The punitive consequences of Szasz’s heroic libertarianism have more public 
support than the case for legalizing the use of illegal drugs. Others, such as Newman (1974), 
accept that dependence exists but oppose compulsory drug treatment on the grounds that it does 
not work. If treatment under coercion were ineffective (as Newman claims), then there would be 
no ethical justification for providing it. Of course, even if treatment under coercion is effective, it 
does not follow that it should be provided. The community may, for example, place a higher 
value on punishing offenders (Hall, 1997). 
 
A consensus view on drug treatment under coercion prepared for the World Health Organization 
(Porter, Arif, & Curran, 1986) concluded that such treatment was legally and ethically justified 
only if (1) the rights of the individuals were protected by ‘‘due process’’ (in accordance with 
human rights principles), and (2) if effective and humane treatment was provided. In the absence 
of due process, coerced treatment could become de facto imprisonment without judicial oversight. 
In the absence of humane and effective treatment, coerced drug treatment could become a cost-
cutting exercise to reduce prison overcrowding. 
 
The uncertain benefits of coerced treatment have led some proponents to argue that offenders 
should be allowed two ‘‘constrained choices’’ (Fox, 1992). The first constrained choice would be 
whether they participate in drug treatment or not. If they declined to be treated, they would be 
dealt with by the criminal justice system in the same way as anyone charged with their offence. 
The second constrained choice would be given to those who agreed to participate in drug 
treatment: this would be a choice of the type of treatment that they received. There is some 
empirical support for these recommendations in that there is better evidence for the effectiveness 
of coerced treatment that requires some ‘‘voluntary interest’’ by the offender (Gerstein & 
Harwood, 1990). 
 
If pharmacological treatments are used under legal coercion, their safety, effectiveness, and cost-
effectiveness should be rigorously evaluated (National Research Council, 2001). We also need to 
ensure that due process is observed and that effective and humane treatment is provided to drug-
dependent offenders. 
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3.3. Preventing addiction 
 
Drug control policies aim to prevent addiction by reducing the availability of drugs. This can be 
accomplished either by banning their use (in the case of cannabis, heroin, and cocaine) or by 
imposing high taxes (e.g., on alcohol and tobacco) and restricting minors’ access (World Health 
Organization, 1998). These policies affect the whole community, not just those who are drug 
dependent or at risk of becoming drug dependent. One might argue that on the grounds of 
efficiency and equity that drug control measures should be focused on those at highest risk of 
becoming drug dependent by virtue of their genetic risk. In other medical settings, this has been 
called ‘‘predictive genetic testing’’ (Evans, Skrzynia, & Burke, 2001). There are a number of 
problems with this proposal. 
 
First, predictive testing is most defensible when we screen for disorders in which a single gene 
confers a high risk of developing a serious disorder for which safe and effective interventions 
exist (Holtzman & Marteau, 2000). When multiple genes predispose to common diseases, there 
are genes by environment interactions, with the result that a person with these genes has an 
increased risk of developing the disease but the probability of their doing is often still quite small 
(Evans et al., 2001). In general, the more genes that are involved in disease susceptibility, the less 
useful information about their genotype is to most individuals (Hall et al., 2002). 
 
Second, given the low prevalence of high-risk combinations of susceptibility genes, a very large 
number of individuals would need to be screened to identify those with these genes. This may be 
expensive and difficult to justify on public health grounds (Vineis, Schulte, & McMichael, 2001). 
 
Third, screening is only justifiable if there is an effective intervention to prevent the disorder in 
those who possess susceptibility genes (Evans et al., 2001). No such interventions exist. The 
development of an effective drug vaccine would provide more incentive for screening but it 
would also raise other ethical issues (e.g., about the right of parents to vaccinate their children). It 
would also raise serious questions of public policy, e.g., would it be more practicable to screen 
and vaccinate or simply to have universal drug vaccination? Who would pay the costs of either 
type of program? How likely is it that such a program would be publicly funded in the face of 
opposition from tobacco manufacturers? 
 
Fourth, there is a possibility that predictive genetic testing may also have perverse and unintended 
effects (Holtzman & Marteau, 2000; Marteau & Croyle, 1998). For example, what effects would 
testing adolescents for susceptibility to drug dependence have on their preparedness to try drugs? 
What effects would it have on health insurance and on the social stigmatization of those who are 
at risk? 
 
3.4. Neuroscience and enhancement 
 
Enhancement is the use of medical interventions, such as drugs and prostheses, to enhance human 
performance or capability (Parens, 1998, 2002) making people ‘‘better than well’’ (Kramer, 
1993). Some critics argue that existing pharmacological treatments are already being used in this 
way. Fukuyama (2002), for example, argues that the selective serotonin 
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reuptake inhibitors (SSRIs), which are used to treat depression, are being used by people who are 
not depressed to modulate mood and change personality. He claims the same is true with the use 
of methylphenidate, which is used to treat attention-deficit hyperactivity disorder. According to 
Fukuyama and others (e.g., Elliott, 2003), this drug is being used to improve attention in children 
and adults who do not have a diagnosable disorder. Other critics predict that future treatments for 
cognitive impairment and memory loss in Alzheimer’s disease will be used to enhance memory 
and cognition in adults who do not have these disorders in analogous ways to the way in which 
Viagra is being used to improve sexual performance in males who do not suffer from erectile 
impotence (Hall, 2003). 
 
Critics of enhancement express concerns that can be usefully classified into two broad categories: 
concerns about the harms that may be experienced by those who use the enhancement 
technologies; and concerns about the adverse social impacts of the widespread promotion and 
societal embrace of enhancement technologies (Farah, 2002). 
 
There are good reasons to be concerned about the possible harms that people who use 
enhancements might experience. The common occurrence of adverse reactions to many 
therapeutic drugs provides abundant empirical evidence of harm from medical interventions. 
These harms are usually outweighed by the relief afforded from the symptoms of disease and 
disability. The trade-off between adverse effects and the less certain benefits of enhancement may 
be less clear, however. 
 
One can argue that addiction is a harm that arises from a type of enhancement: the use of mood 
altering drugs to improve mood and well-being. It arguably represents a pharmacological 
misappropriation of brain mechanisms selected by evolution to reward behavior that is required 
for individual and species survival, such as eating, drinking, and copulating (Hall, 2002; Hill & 
Newlin, 2002). Some generalize the evolutionary argument, arguing that all technologically 
achieved gains in human performance necessarily involve trade-offs between human abilities 
selected by our ancestral environment. If, for example, we optimize some abilities, this is likely to 
be at a cost in overall performance (Farah, 2002). Those who defend enhancement concede that 
there may be adverse side effects but argue that the use of enhancement technologies should be 
monitored for adverse effects so that potential users can be advised of their risks (Caplan, 2002; 
Stock, 2002). 
 
Two concerns have been expressed about the societal implications of widespread use of 
enhancement technologies. First and foremost is the concern that marked social inequities in 
access to enhancement technologies will amplify existing social inequities (Farah, 2002; 
Fukuyama, 2002; Parens, 2002). Those who defend enhancement argue that this is more a 
criticism of existing social hierarchies than a compelling objection to enhancement (Caplan, 
2002, 2003). This objection could be used, for example, to justify bans on private education. It 
could in any case be easily overcome bymaking all forms of enhancement freely available to all at 
low cost, e.g., by putting enhancing drugs in the water supply or publicly subsidizing the use of 
enhancement technologies, as many developed societies do with medical treatments and with 
what are arguably forms of medical enhancement, such as IVF and contraception (Parens, 2002). 
A second concern about the social impacts of enhancement technologies is that their widespread 
use will raise the standards for what counts as normalcy (Farah, 2002; Parens, 2002). This would, 
these critics suggest, force an arms race in the use of enhancement 
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technologies in which everyone would be coerced into using enhancement technologies as a way 
of ‘‘keeping up with the Joneses’’ who already use them. Such a trend would increase 
discrimination against the disabled and people with medical conditions who declined to be 
enhanced (Parens, 2002). The rejoinder of those who defend enhancement is that the logical 
implication of the critics’ argument is that those who do not want to be enhanced should be able 
to coercively prevent those who do from being enhanced (Caplan, 2002). Caplan (2002) argues 
that this policy is not followed elsewhere in society, e.g., in policies towards private education, 
academic coaching, or cosmetic surgery. 
 
The history of psychopharmacology reveals inconsistent attitudes towards 
psychopharmacological enhancement (Healy, 2001). In the late 1960s, a ‘‘counterculture’’ arose 
in many developed societies that celebrated antipsychiatrists, such as R. D. Laing, who combined 
an enthusiasm for the mind-expanding effects of cannabis and LSD with hostility to the use of 
psychotropic drugs to treat schizophrenia. 
 
3.5. Neuroscience, prediction, and privacy 
 
Advances in neuroimaging technologies raise the possibility of ‘‘reading people’s minds’’ by 
using these methods to ascertain the truthfulness of what defendants or suspects tell the police 
(Farah, 2002; Foster, Wolpe, & Caplan, 2003; Ross, 2003). This is more of an aspiration than 
reality at present, although some entrepreneurs claim that electrophysiological methods can be 
used to tell if a person is telling the truth (Foster et al., 2003). Future improvements in 
neuroimaging may, even if imperfectly, disclose facts about a person that they may prefer to keep 
private (Ross, 2003). Farah (2002) has pointed out, for example, that a substantial minority of 
drug-dependent persons show a characteristic pattern of brain activation in response to drug cues 
that could enable them to be identified as drug dependent (Farah, 2002). 
 
Neuroscience investigations may also provide information that proves to be predictive of disease 
risk in the same way as genes for Mendelian disorders like Huntington’s disease (Foster et al., 
2003; Greely, 2002). Characteristic patterns of brain activity in childhood and adolescence, for 
example, may predict increased risks of addiction later in adult life. This possibility raises the 
same ethical issues (e.g., privacy and discrimination) that are raised by testing for alleles that 
predict an increased risk of serious neurological disease (Greely, 2002). These potential 
developments raise important ethical issues, particularly whether persons should be compelled to 
undergo such tests by the courts, insurance companies, or employers. Similar issues will arise 
with the potential use by insurers and employers of neuroimaging tests undertaken in the course 
of medical treatment. The claims of entrepreneurs promoting these technologies to the public 
(e.g., as tests of marital fidelity) raise the need for consumer protection against the 
overinterpretation of equivocal test results and bogus claims (Caplan, 2002; Farah, 2002). 
 
3.6. Neuroscience and the media 
 
Public interest in scientific findings and the political imperative for scientists to justify public 
funding have increased pressure on scientists to report their research findings in the 
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popular media (Resnik, 1998). This is an unwelcome development for many neuroscientists who 
are concerned that journalists will sensationalize or trivialize their research or that other less 
scrupulous scientists will use the media to advance their careers or to enhance their chances of 
being funded (Blakemore, 2002). 
 
Leading scientists have historically accepted a social responsibility to educate the public. In the 
19th century, Michael Faraday and Thomas Huxley gave public lectures on science and wrote 
about science for the popular press (Blakemore, 2002). In our own day, Carl Sagan, Stephen 
Hawking, Richard Dawkins, Colin Blakemore, Steven J. Gould, and James Watson have written 
for the general public. They have accepted that they have a moral obligation to ensure that the 
public is well informed about science (Blakemore, 2002). 
 
Given the public interest in neuroscience research, potential misunderstandings may rebound to 
the detriment of neuroscience and genetics. Neuroscientists and geneticists arguably have a moral 
responsibility to be proactive in their dealings with the media (Blakemore, 2002). They need to 
ensure that accurate information is released to the media and that their publications include 
prominent disclaimers that anticipate and correct predictable misinterpretations of their findings. 
Geneticists need to be aware that journalists often operate with a neo-Mendelian folk genetics in 
which an ‘‘addiction’’ gene means that if one has the gene one is highly likely to become an 
addict while its absence is strongly protective. Funding bodies and universities need to encourage 
scientists to undertake media training and recognize good media work as a legitimate activity for 
scientists to engage in (Blakemore, 2002). 
 
4. Summary 
 
The potential benefits of an improved understanding of the neuroscience bases of addiction are 
improved treatment and possibly the prevention of drug addiction. The type of research required 
to realize these promises will pose ethical issues about the capacity of addicted persons to give 
free and informed consent to participate in studies that involve the administration of drugs of 
dependence. 
 
Neuroscience research on addiction may transform the long-running debate between moral and 
medical models of addiction by providing a detailed causal explanation of addiction in terms of 
brain processes. The claim that addiction is a ‘‘brain disease’’ that results from chronic drug 
abuse undermines the moral view that addiction is wholly a matter of individual choice and hence 
that drug users are best dealt with by punishment and imprisonment. Medical models of addiction 
may also be misinterpreted as supporting simple-minded social policies. It may, for example, lead 
to the seductive simplification that if we identify the minority that is genetically and biologically 
vulnerable to alcohol dependence, then the rest of the population can use alcohol with impunity. 
It can also lead to a preoccupation with individual explanations of behavior to the neglect of 
social policies for reducing addiction. Neuroscience research may raise other issues. The use of 
pharmacotherapies and drug vaccines to treat addiction under legal coercion is likely to be 
contentious, as will the potential use of drugs and prostheses to enhance human performance. 
Advances in neuroimaging may 
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enable us to ‘‘read brains’’ and predict future disease risk. These possibilities raise concerns 
about invasion of privacy, third-party use of neuroimaging data, the powers of courts to coerce 
defendants to undergo such tests, and consumer protection. Neuroscientists arguably have a moral 
obligation to ensure that the media gets the science right. They certainly have a professional 
interest in minimizing misunderstandings of their work in the media that may rebound to the 
detriment of neuroscience and genetics. 
 
 
 
Acknowledgements 
Earlier versions of this paper were presented at an International Conference on Neuroscience and 
Addictions: New Directions, New Hopes. Mexico City, Mexico, June 2002, and a meeting of the Canadian 
Institutes of Health Research Institutes of Genetics and Neuroscience, Mental Health and Addiction at 
Point Jackson, Ontario, in November 2003. We would like to thank Sarah Yeates for her help in locating 
the literature and in preparing the manuscript for publication. 
 
 
 
References 
 
Adler, M. W. (1995). Human subject issues in drug abuse research. College on problems of drug dependence. Drug and 
Alcohol Dependence, 37, 167–175. 
Alexander, J. R., Lerer, B., & Baron, M. (1992). Ethical issues in genetic linkage studies of psychiatric disorders. 
British Journal of Psychiatry, 160, 98–102. 
Andrews, G., Henderson, S., & Hall, W. D. (2001). Prevalence, comorbidity, disability and service utilisation: 
Overview of the Australian national mental health survey. British Journal of Psychiatry, 178, 145–153. 
Anthony, J. C., & Helzer, J. (1991). Syndromes of drug abuse and dependence. In L. N. Robins, & D. A. Regier (Eds.), 
Psychiatric disorders in America ( pp. 116–154). New York: Academic Press. 
Australian Law Reform Commission, National Health and Medical Research Council, and Australian Health Ethics 
Committee, D. A. (2003). Essentially yours: The protection of human genetic information in Australia, vol. 96. Sydney: 
Australian Law Reform Commission. 
Ball, D., & Collier, D. (2002). Substance misuse. In P. McGuffin, M. J. Owen, & I. I. Gottesman (Eds.), Psychiatric 
genetics and genomics ( pp. 263–302). Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Blakemore, C. (2002). From the ‘‘public understanding of science’’ to scientists’ understanding of the public. In S. J. 
Marcus (Ed.), Neuroethics: Mapping the field ( pp. 211–221). New York: Dana Press. 
Brody, B.A. (1998). The ethics of biomedical research: An international perspective. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Cami, J., & Farre, M. (2003). Drug addiction. New England Journal of Medicine, 349, 975–986. 
Caplan, A. (2002). No-brainer: Can we cope with the ethical ramifications of new knowledge of the human brain? In S. 
J. Marcus (Ed.), Neuroethics: Mapping the field ( pp. 95–106). New York: Dana Press. 
Caplan, A. (2003). Is better best? Scientific American, 389 (3), 84–85. 
Carpenter, W. T. Jr., Schooler, N. R., & Kane, J. M. (1997). The rationale and ethics of medication-free research in 
schizophrenia. Archives of General Psychiatry, 54, 401–407. 
Charland, L. C. (2002). Cynthia’s dilemma: Consenting to heroin prescription. American Journal of Bioethics, 2 (2), 
37–47. 
Cohen, P.J. (2002). Untreated addiction imposes an ethical bar to recruiting addicts for non-therapeutic studies of 
addictive drugs. Journal of Law, Medicine and Ethics, 30, 73–81. 
 
Addictive Behaviors 29 (7) 2004 : 1481–1495.                                   doi: 10.1016/j.addbeh.2004.06.001 
 
Collins, D. J., & Lapsley, H. M. (2002). Counting the cost: Estimates of the social costs of drug abuse in Australia in 
1998–9 vol. 49. Canberra: Commonwealth Department of Health and Ageing. 
Dolan, K., Wodak, A., Hall, W., Gaughwin, M., & Rae, F. (1996). HIV risk behaviour of IDUs before, during and after 
imprisonment in New South Wales. Addiction Research, 4, 151–160. 
Dolinsky, Z., & Babor, T. F. (1997). Ethical, scientific and clinical issues in ethanol administration research involving 
alcoholics as human subjects. Addiction, 92, 1087–1097. 
Elliott, C. (2003). Better than well: American medicine meets the American dream. New York: W.W. Norton. 
Evans, J. P., Skrzynia, C., & Burke, W. (2001). The complexities of predictive genetic testing. BMJ, 322, 1052– 1056. 
Ezzati, M., Lopez, A. D., Rodgers, A., Vander Hoorn, S., & Murray, C. J. L. (2002). Selected major risk factors and 
global and regional burden of disease. Lancet, 360, 1347–1360. 
Farah, M. J. (2002). Emerging ethical issues in neuroscience. Nature Neuroscience, 5, 1123–1129. 
Foster, K. R., Wolpe, P. R., & Caplan, A. L. (2003). Bioethics and the brain. IEEE Spectrum, 40 (3), 34–39. 
Fox, R. G. (1992). The compulsion of voluntary treatment in sentencing. Criminal Law Journal, 16, 37–54. 
Fu, C. H., & McGuire, P. K. (1999). Functional neuroimaging in psychiatry. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal 
Society of London. Series B, Biological Sciences, 354, 1359–1370. 
Fukuyama, F. (2002). Our posthuman future: Consequences of the biotechnology revolution. New York: Farrar Straus 
and Giroux. 
Gerstein, D. R., & Harwood, H.J. (1990). Treating drug problems volume 1: A study of effectiveness and financing of 
public and private drug treatment systems. Washington, DC: Institute of Medicine, National Academy Press. 
Gilman, S. (1998). Imaging the brain. First of two parts. New England Journal of Medicine, 338, 812–820. 
Gorelick, D., Pickens, R. W., & Benkovsky, F. O. (1999). Clinical research in substance abuse: Human subjects issues. 
In H. A. Pincus, J. A. Lieberman, & S. Ferris (Eds.), Ethics in psychiatric research: A resource manual for human 
subjects protection ( pp. 177–218). Washington, DC: American Psychiatric Association. 
Greely, H. T. (2002). Neuroethics and ELSI: Some comparisons and considerations. In S.J. Marcus (Ed.), Neuroethics: 
Mapping the field ( pp. 83–91). New York: Dana Press. 
Hall, L. L. (1999). Medication discontinuation and symptom provocation in research: A consumer and family 
perspective. Biological Psychiatry, 46, 1017–1020. 
Hall, S. S. (2003). The quest for a smart pill. Scientific American, 289 (3), 36–45. 
Hall, W. D. (1997). The role of legal coercion in the treatment of offenders with alcohol and heroin problems. 
Australian and New Zealand Journal of Criminology, 30, 103–120. 
Hall, W. D. (2002). Taking Darwin seriously: More than telling just so stories. Addiction, 97, 472–473. 
Hall, W. D., Madden, P., & Lynskey, M. (2002). The genetics of tobacco use: Methods, findings and policy 
implications. Tobacco Control, 11, 119–124. 
Hall, W. D., & Sannibale, C. (1996). Are there two types of alcoholism? Lancet, 348, 1258. 
Healy, D. (2001). The psychopharmacologists III: Interviews by David Healy. London: Edward Arnold Publishers. 
Helzer, J. E., Burnam, A., & McEvoy, L. T. (1991). Alcohol abuse and dependence. In L. N. Robins, & D.A. Regier 
(Eds.), Psychiatric disorders in America: The epidemiologic catchment area study ( pp. 81–115). New York: Free 
Press. 
Hill, E. M., & Newlin, D. B. (2002). Evolutionary approaches to addiction: Introduction. Addiction, 97, 375–379. 
Holtzman, N. A., & Marteau, T. M. (2000). Will genetics revolutionize medicine? New England Journal of Medicine, 
343, 141–144. 
Inciardi, J. A., & McBride, D. C. (1991). Treatment alternatives to street crime: History, experiences and issues. 
Rockville, MD: National Institute of Drug Abuse. 
Independent Working Group on Brain and Mind Disorders, D. C. (2003). Brain and mind disorders: Impact of the 
neurosciences. Canberra: Prime Minister’s Science, Engineering and Innovation Council. 
Jonsen, A. R. (1998). The birth of bioethics. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Kessler, R. C., McGonagle, K. A., Zhao, S., Nelson, C. B., Hughes, M., Eshleman, S., Wittshen, H. U., & Kendler, K. 
S. (1994). Lifetime and 12-month prevalence of DSM-III-R psychiatric disorders in the United States. Results from the 
national comorbidity survey. Archives of General Psychiatry, 51, 8–19. 
 
 
 
Addictive Behaviors 29 (7) 2004 : 1481–1495.                                   doi: 10.1016/j.addbeh.2004.06.001 
 
Kling, M. A., Carson, R. E., Borg, L., Zametkin, A., Matochik, J. A., Schluger, J., Herscovitch, P., Rice, K. C., Ho, A., 
Eckleman, W. C., & Kreek, M. J. (2000). Opioid receptor imaging with positron emission tomography and [(18)F] 
cyclofoxy in long-term, methadone-treated former heroin addicts. Journal of Pharmacology and Experimental 
Therapeutics, 295, 1070–1076. 
Kramer, P. (1993). Listening to Prozac. New York: Penguin. 
Leshner, A. I. (1997). Addiction is a brain disease, and it matters. Science, 278, 45–47. 
Maldonado, R. (2003). The neurobiology of addiction. Journal of Neural Transmission, 66, 1–14. 
Marteau, T. M., & Croyle, R. T. (1998). The new genetics. Psychological responses to genetic testing. BMJ, 316, 693–
696. 
Martin-Soelch, C., Leenders, K. L., Chevalley, A. F., Missimer, J., Kunig, G., Magyar, S., Mino, A., & Schultz, W. 
(2001). Reward mechanisms in the brain and their role in dependence: Evidence from neurophysiological and 
neuroimaging studies. Brain Research: Brain Research Reviews, 36, 139–149. 
Mauron, A. (2003). Renovating the house of being: genomes, souls, and selves. Annals of the New York Academy of 
Sciences, 1001, 240–252. 
Munafo, M., Johnstone, E., Murphy, M., & Walton, R. (2001). New directions in the genetic mechanisms underlying 
nicotine addiction. Addiction Biology, 6, 109–117. 
Murray, C. J. L., & Lopez, A. D. (1996). Evidence-based health policy: Lessons from the Global Burden of Disease 
Study. Science, 274, 740–743. 
National Academy of Science, A. D. (1996). Pathways of addiction: Opportunities in drug abuse research. Washington, 
DC: National Academy Press. 
National Bioethics Advisory Commission, A. D. (1999). Research involving persons with mental disorders that may 
affect decisionmaking capacity. Rockville, MD: National Bioethics Advisory Commission. 
National Health and Medical Research Council, A. D. (2000). Ethical aspects of human genetic testing: An information 
paper. Canberra: Author. 
National Research Council, A. D. (2001). Informing America’s policy on illegal drugs: What we don’t know keeps 
hurting us. Washington, DC: National Academy Press. 
Nelkin, D., & Lindee, M. S. (1996). ‘‘Genes made me do it’’: The appeal of biological explanations. Politics and the 
Life Sciences, 15, 95–97. 
Newman, R. G. (1974). Involuntary treatment of drug addiction. In P. G. Bourne (Ed.), Addiction ( pp. 113–126). New 
York: Academic Press. 
Nuffield Council on Bioethics, P. G. (1998). Mental disorders and genetics: The ethical context. London: Author. 
Parens, E. (1998). Is better always good? The enhancement project. In E. Parens (Ed.), Enhancing human traits: 
Ethical and social implications ( pp. 1–28). Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press. 
Parens, E. (2002). How far will the treatment/enhancement distinction get us as we grapple with new ways to shape 
ourselves? In S. J. Marcus (Ed.), Neuroethics: Mapping the field ( pp. 152–158). New York: Dana Press. 
Parker, L. S. (2002). Ethical issues in bipolar disorders pedigree research: Privacy concerns, informed consent, and 
grounds for waiver. Bipolar Disorders, 4, 1–16. 
Porter, L., Arif, A., & Curran, W. J. (1986). The law and the treatment of drug and alcohol dependent persons: A 
comparative study of existing legislation. Geneva: World Health Organization. 
Resnik, D. B. (1998). The ethics of science: An introduction. London: Routledge. 
Roberts, L. W., & Roberts, B. (1999). Psychiatric research ethics: An overview of evolving guidelines and current 
ethical dilemmas in the study of mental illness. Biological Psychiatry, 46, 1025–1038. 
Roskies, A. (2002). Neuroethics for the new millennium. Neuron, 35, 21–23. 
Ross, P. (2003). Mind readers. Scientific American, 289 (3), 54–57. 
Safire, W. (2002). Visions for a new field of ‘‘neuroethics’’. In S. J. Marcus (Ed.), Neuroethics: Mapping the field ( pp. 
3–9). New York: Dana Press. 
Sell, L. A., Morris, J., Bearn, J., Frackowiak, R. S., Friston, K. J., & Dolan, R. J. (1999). Activation of reward circuitry 
in human opiate addicts. European Journal of Neuroscience, 11, 1042–1048. 
Shamoo, A.E. (1998). Ethics in neurobiological research with human subjects: The Baltimore Conference on Ethics. 
Amsterdam: Gordon and Breach. 
 
 
Addictive Behaviors 29 (7) 2004 : 1481–1495.                                   doi: 10.1016/j.addbeh.2004.06.001 
 
Spooner, C., & Hall, W. D. (2002). Preventing drug misuse by young people: We need to do more than ‘just say no’. 
Addiction, 97, 478–481. 
Spooner, C., Hall, W. D., & Mattick, R. P. (2001). An overview of diversion strategies for Australian drug-related 
offenders. Drug and Alcohol Review, 20, 281–294. 
Stock, G. (2002). Redesigning humans: Choosing our children’s genes. London: Profile Books. 
Szasz, T. (1997). Ceremonial chemistry: The ritual persecution of drugs, addicts and pushers. (Revised ed.). Holmes 
Beach, FL: Learning Publications. 
True, W. R., Xian, H., Scherrer, J. F., Madden, P. A., Bucholz, K.K., Heath, A. C., Eisen, S. A., Lyons, M. J., 
Goldberg, J., & Tsuang, M. (1999). Common genetic vulnerability for nicotine and alcohol dependence in men. 
Archives of General Psychiatry, 56, 655–661. 
Tyndale, R.F. (2003). Genetics of alcohol and tobacco use in humans. Annals of Medicine, 35, 94–121. 
Valenstein, E.S. (1998). Blaming the brain: The truth about drugs and mental health. New York: Free Press. 
Vineis, P., Schulte, P., & McMichael, A. J. (2001). Misconceptions about the use of genetic tests in populations. 
Lancet, 357, 709–712. 
Walton, R., Johnstone, E., Munafo, M., Neville, M., & Griffiths, S. (2001). Genetic clues to the molecular basis of 
tobacco addiction and progress towards personalized therapy. Trends in Molecular Medicine, 7, 70–76. 
World Health Organization, S. (1998). Guidelines for controlling and monitoring the tobacco epidemic. Geneva: World 
Health Organization. 
 
 
